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Abstract: 
 
This paper addresses the EU’s influence on the design of market-building objectives 
and dispute settlement mechanisms in Mercosur and SADC over time. It argues that 
such influence has had an independent effect on the evolution of regional institutional 
design that is not reducible to mere functional dynamics, which dominant 
explanations emphasize. Instead, it suggests that EU influence is best conceived as a 
process of spurred emulation, according to which major political or economic crises 
in the regions have led to the increasing emulation of EU arrangements, spurred by 
the EU’s active involvement in the process. This has, however, neither led to a 
wholesale copying of EU institutional models nor to the adoption of EU practices, but 
EU templates have regularly been adapted to fit with policy-makers’ normative 
convictions, especially their continuing concerns about national sovereignty. 
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INTRODUCTION1 
The latest wave of regionalism – understood as the state-driven integration of national 
economies – in Southern Africa and South America, which started in the 1980s, is 
distinct from most other attempts in the two continents, in that policy-makers 
explicitly rejected the EC template in an attempt to avoid the “fallacy of 
transposition”, which had plagued most of them (Langhammer and Hiemenz 1990). 
The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) established 
in 1980 and the Economic Cooperation and Integration Programme (PICE) between 
Argentina and Brazil from 1986 were based on gradual and selective regional 
cooperation rather than across-the-board market integration and featured weak and 
purely intergovernmental institutions, rejecting any ceding of national sovereignty. 
Policy-makers in both regions shared the conviction that their organizations ought to 
follow a “deliberately business-like approach, in which institutions follow 
achievement” (cited in Anglin 1983: 696), and which was “built on concrete projects 
and specific programmes rather than grandiose schemes and massive bureaucratic 
institutions” (SADCC 1980: 19).  
 
Since then, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), founded in 1991 
as the successor of SADCC, and Mercosur, established in the same year as an 
extension of Argentina and Brazil’s bilateral cooperation efforts to Uruguay and 
Paraguay, have come a long way. One of the most striking features of both regions’ 
evolution is that they are now solidly set on a path of ambitious market integration, 
flanked by powerful supranational courts that curtail member state’s sovereignty. 
Both the market integration objectives and approaches as well as the Court’s designs 
are close copies of EC/EU models, which is even more puzzling given that alternative 
institutional models have become available in the form of NAFTA and the WTO 
dispute settlement procedure that seem to fit much better with policy-makers initial 
preferences for ‘pragmatic’ cooperation based on weak and sovereignty-preserving 
institutionalization. How can we account for this cross-temporal evolution, and 
specifically the respective institutional designs? 
                                                
1 I would like to thank Tanja Börzel, Ulrike Lorenz, Gary Marks, Osvaldo Saldías, Ingeborg Tömmel 
as well as the participants of a workshop at the Free University of Berlin and the Berlin Conference on 
Comparative Regionalism for very helpful comments on an earlier version of this article. Moreover, 
financial support by the KFG Research College ‘The Transformative Power of Europe’ at the Free 
University of Berlin is gratefully acknowledged.  
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Functional theories of institutional change might attribute this evolution to shifting 
structural conditions encountered by policy-makers, which was informed by a process 
of rational learning from EU institutional models (Pierson 2004). In this view, strong 
dispute settlement mechanisms embody an attempt to ensure the credibility of market 
liberalization commitments (see Smith 2000). In this article, I challenge such purely 
functional explanations by drawing attention to the role of EU influence on formal 
institutional design and evolution. More specifically, I suggest that this evolution is 
best conceived as a process of spurred emulation from the respective EU models, 
according to which major political or economic crises has lead to the increasing 
emulation of EU models for mainly social reasons, spurred by the EU’s active 
involvement in the process. This has, however, neither led to a wholesale copying of 
EU institutional models nor to the adoption of EU practices, but EU templates have 
regularly been adapted to fit with policy-makers’ normative convictions, especially 
their continuing concerns about national sovereignty. Hence, while functional 
dynamics certainly form a part of the story, they are at best insufficient or, at worst, 
quite misleading.  
 
This argument builds on a rapidly growing body of work that has started to document 
and explain horizontal EU influence on regional integration efforts in other parts of 
the world through processes of learning, emulation and persuasion (Alter 2008; Duina 
2010; Jetschke 2010; Lombaerde and Schulz 2009; Yeo 2008). While these works 
have looked at individual instances of EU influence or have approached the topic as a 
series of instances based on a ‘snapshot picture’ (Pierson) of time (a partial exception 
is Jetschke 2009), this article seeks to highlight the dynamic and often cumulative 
effects of EU influence across time. The article proceeds in three parts. The first part 
sets the diffusion concept in the context of the literature on comparative regionalism 
and discusses its mechanisms and scope conditions. Parts Two and Three then trace 
the effects of EU influence on market-building objectives and dispute settlement 
procedures (DSMs), assessing the account against the null hypothesis of functional 
explanations. Evidence is based on extensive interviews in both regions as well as a 
host of primary and secondary sources. 
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COMPARATIVE REGIONALISM, DIFFUSION AND EU INFLUENCE: 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The bulk of the existing literature on global regionalism has almost exclusively 
focused on domestic factors to account for its dynamics and outcomes, often against 
the background of globalization dynamics (for example, Coleman and Underhill 
1998; Gamble and Payne 1996). The small strand of literature that has addressed 
external influences in global regionalism (apart from structural changes in the world 
economy) has conceptualized it primarily as a form of top-down hegemonic power 
(see Katzenstein 2005; Robles 2008). The diffusion concept has therefore barely been 
applied in this literature (notable exceptions are Baldwin 1993 and some of the work 
cited before). It nevertheless forms an important complement to the existing literature 
in that it draws our attention to a form of external influence that has so far been 
largely neglected, namely horizontal influence (see Jetschke and Lenz 2010).  
 
Diffusion theorists have conceptualized the temporal and spatial clustering of certain 
phenomena as a process of interdependent decision-making. In an important recent 
contribution, Simmons et al. (2006: 787) analyze situations in which “government 
policy decisions in a country are systematically conditioned by prior policy choices 
made in other countries.” According to this view, an important logic of external 
influence is one of indirectly affecting decision-making from the outside rather than 
intervening directly in the domestic politics of other countries or regions by levelling 
sticks (or carrots). In contrast to existing accounts of external influences in global 
regionalism, therefore, diffusion does not presuppose an asymmetric/hierarchical or 
even direct relationship between two identifiable actors, as also most of the 
Europeanization literature does (see Börzel and Risse 2011: 5). Such a 
conceptualization thus shifts analytical attention from the influence-wielder to the 
receiving end of external influence. In the current context, this implies understanding 
why governmental actors, especially in powerful member states in the two regions, 
were willing to shift their initial preferences increasingly towards EU-style integration 
objectives and DSMs. In the remainder of this section, I therefore discuss the 
mechanisms and scope conditions that affect the adoption (and adaptation) of EU 
institutional models, as outlined in the introduction. 
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Mechanisms 
Shifting analytical attention to the receiving end of EU influence implies a turn 
towards the mechanisms of indirect influence. For the purposes of this article, I pitch 
lesson-drawing and normative emulation as alternative accounts of indirect EU 
influence.2 Hence, to the extent that EU influence plays a role at all, the question is 
whether its impact is based on the rational calculation of costs and benefits or whether 
it hinges on socially constructed ideas about appropriate behaviour. 
 
Policy-makers elsewhere draw lessons from the EU when they believe that it will help 
solve domestic problems effectively (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 22). The 
EU has developed a host of institutional solutions to a variety of cooperation 
problems, thereby forming an ideal exemplar to study complex cause-effect 
relationships in regional integration. Given this state of affairs, lesson-drawing from 
the EU appears like a ‘natural’ characteristic of any process of rational policy-making 
in regional integration (see James and Lodge 2003). We would be surprised not to 
find it. Normative emulation, on the other hand, occurs for two broad sets of reasons. 
A first set has to do with cognitive constraints on information processing. When 
successful models are theorized in abstract and seemingly universally applicable 
categories, they are more likely to be emulated, especially when they are readily 
available ‘for download’ (McDermott 2001; Strang and Meyer 1993). EU institutional 
models possess all these features. Much social science research has sought to theorize 
EU governance in terms of general cause-effect relationships of the form ‘a 
supranational court leads to successful enforcement and therefore implementation’ 
and has widely spread these insights across the globe. A second set of reasons is of a 
social nature. Where actors perceive to “belong to a common social category” with 
the EU, emulation is more likely to occur (Strang and Meyer 1993: 490). Others 
might hence emulate EU institutional models because they identify with the EU, want 
to receive its legitimacy and recognition and, in the most extreme case, simply take 
EU institutional models for granted. 
 
                                                
2 The third mechanism – competition – is mainly relevant as a spur to the inception of or deepening of 
a regional integration process, but less useful when institutional design is the major question of interest 
(see Mattli 1999). It will therefore not be further considered. 
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The editors rightly note that lesson-drawing and normative emulation are often hard 
to distinguish empirically. I suggest, however, that there are at least three observable 
implications, which allow us to adjudicate between them, referring to trigger, process 
and outcome, respectively. First, lesson-drawing occurs in response to a concrete 
functional problem to which (institutional) solutions are sought (Rose 1991), whereas 
emulation forms a reaction to situations of great uncertainty about means-ends 
relationships and ambiguous goals (DiMaggio and Powell 1991) (trigger). Second, 
lesson-drawing leads us to expect ‘serious’ regional debate among policy-makers 
regarding the lessons that can be learned from the respective EU model, generally 
underpinned by a process of expert consultations or the commissioning of scientific 
studies as a form of prospective evaluation (Mossberger and Wolman 2003); 
emulation, on the other hand, occurs in the absence of such cost-benefit calculations 
(process). Third, lesson-drawing leads us to expect functional equivalents of EU 
models, given the diversity in political and institutional contexts (see Kahler and Lake 
2009), whereas emulation should lead to the prevalence of wholesale copies (Strang 
and Meyer 1993: 500). To the extent that we do see adaptations, variance between 
formal EU models, on the one side, and those in Mercosur and SADC on the other 
reflects differences in institutional and political contexts (e.g. democracy, statehood 
etc) for lesson-drawing and divergences in normative convictions (e.g. attitudes about 
sovereignty) in the case of emulation (outcome).  
Scope Conditions 
The central puzzle of this article refers to variation in the degree of EU-style regional 
institutionalization over time in both regions. We therefore need to ask about the 
conditions under which the initial preferences3 for ‘pragmatic’ cooperation based on 
weak and sovereignty-preserving institutionalization or the respective power 
constellations sustaining them might shift. For the influence of two scope conditions 
suggested by the editors – state capacity and regime type – I seek to control largely by 
design. The diversity of these conditions across as well as within regions are difficult 
to match systematically with the broadly similar outcomes in both regions in terms of 
market-building objectives and DSM design (most different systems design). 
Domestic politics and power asymmetries, on the other hand, are highly relevant; the 
                                                
3 I am indifferent to the nature and depth of these preference shifts (preferences over strategies vs. 
preferences outcomes). 
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question is how they matter. I suggest that a dynamic combination of two factors is 
generally sufficient to generate EU influence effects: the active promotion of such 
effects by actors outside of the regional decision-making arena, who have no formal 
decision-making power (spurring), and facilitating structural conditions.  
 
Regarding the first, a range of actors outside the formal decision-making arenas, 
including external as well as non-governmental internal actors, might have an interest 
in affecting regional decision-making in the direction of EU-style institutional change 
for a variety of reasons. The EU tends to be the most active external actor in this 
context, deploying a range of material and ideational resources to support region-
building processes in other parts of the world (see introduction). It is more likely to be 
successful in these endeavours, the greater the power asymmetries between both 
sides, i.e. the more the counterpart is dependent on the ideational and material 
resources the EU can offer. It is important to note, however, that such involvement, 
the largest bulk of which takes the form of financial and technical assistance, is never 
directly related to the outcomes of regional institutional change as such. In other 
words, the EU does not use material incentives in pursuit of a specific institutional 
design. For example, it might tie the negotiation of an interregional trade agreement to 
the condition that its goods can circulate freely across the counterpart region, as it has 
done in Mercosur, but this condition cannot account for a particular institutional 
arrangement (such as a specific customs arrangement) designed in response. Hence, 
the effects of direct EU support tend to be of a more diffuse nature in that they – 
consciously or unconsciously – spur developments in this direction rather than affect 
the outcomes of institutional change directly.  
 
On the other hand, internal non-governmental actors such as advocacy groups or 
epistemic communities might advocate EU-style institutional change and thereby also 
spur EU influence effects. The extent to which these actors successfully advance their 
demands with governments depends on the particularities of the domestic political 
process such as their ability to access policy-makers and make their voice heard.4 The 
crucial point here, however, is that these groups tend to become stronger over time, as 
the EU actively supports the formation and strengthening of ‘EU-centred epistemic 
                                                
4 This may, to some extent, also depend on regime type and state capacity. 
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communities’ (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 22). Therefore, once the EU 
gets actively involved in a region-building process, such non-governmental internal 
actors ceteris paribus tend to become more effective in spurring EU influence effects 
because they have more resources at their disposal. 
 
Regarding the second scope condition, EU influence effects are unlikely to 
materialize in the absence of facilitating structural conditions, even when a variety of 
actors seeks to spur them. Deeply entrenched member state preferences and the power 
configurations sustaining a regional institutional equilibrium are unlikely to shift in 
the absence of changing structural incentives to do so (Keohane 1984). Hence, they 
are a necessary condition to open a ‘window of opportunity’ for EU influence effects 
to occur. However, they ‘do not come with an instruction sheet’ and are therefore 
generally indeterminate as to the specific responses they require (see Blyth 2003). 
MARKET-BUILDING OBJECTIVES: EMULATING EUROPE’S COMMON 
MARKET MODEL 
At their inception in the early 1990s, policy-makers in both Mercosur and SADC 
moved towards ambitious EC-style common market (CM) objectives, thereby parting 
with their rather shallow cooperation strategy that had dominated intra-regional 
relations before. I argue that this shift reflects the ambition to emulate the EC’s 
successful market-integration model in a situation in which previous beliefs about 
‘pragmatic’ regional cooperation strategies appeared increasingly insufficient in the 
face of major geopolitical and economic change in world politics. 
 
When countries in Southern Africa started to cooperate as an economically-oriented 
outgrowth of the Frontline State’s fight against South African destabilization, their 
main ambition was to achieve ‘economic liberation’ from their stronger and hostile 
neighbor. This was to be achieved through the organization of joint projects in 
selected sectors with the support of international donors (Tostensen and Mandaza 
1994). Similarly, policy-makers in Argentina and Brazil launched a process of gradual 
rapprochement in the mid-1980s during their transitions to democracy, which aimed 
at overcoming deep-seated rivalries between the two countries. The PICE consisted of 
a series of protocols in selected sectors providing for tariff reductions and economic 
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complementation, which was extended in 1988 with the Treaty of Integration, 
Cooperation and Development envisioning the gradual establishment of a Free Trade 
Area (FTA) (Hurrell 1995: 253). Regional cooperation approaches in both regions 
were gradual and selective, strongly conditioned by the inward-oriented development 
models that had dominated in the two regions for decades.  
 
These models of regional cooperation underwent fundamental change in the late 
1980s, early 1990s as a result of various interrelated factors – all of which questioned 
and ultimately unsettled previously established convictions and changed policy-
makers’ calculus regarding strategies that were more firmly oriented towards trade 
liberalization and market integration. Internationally, multilateral trade liberalization 
efforts under the GATT framework had stalled in the Uruguay Round; the US started 
to pursue regional trade liberalization itself with NAFTA, the Free Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA) and APEC, while the EC deepened its integration endeavour with 
the Single Market programme (Cable 1994: 1-2; Mansfield and Milner 1999). 
Moreover, in both regions the foreign debt crisis reached its climax in the late 1980s 
and led to the widespread realization that the old development models based on the 
protection of national markets were unsuited for future economic well-being. In such 
a situation, outward-oriented trade liberalization (rather than mere cooperation) 
strategies became increasingly attractive for countries in the global South. 
 
While the general move towards trade liberalization can thus be attributed to changing 
material incentives at the time, it is largely indeterminate as to the exact content this 
change would take. In other words, why did policy-makers adopt an EC-type CM 
model rather than a ‘simpler’ NAFTA-type FTA model? This becomes even more 
puzzling when we consider the wider international and ideational context at the time, 
characterized by the hegemony of the Washington Consensus, which betrayed deep 
and well-regulated economic integration endeavours of the form that the creation of a 
CM required. After the decision, international financial institutions were therefore 
quick to harshly criticize Mercosur and other regions (see Yeats 1998). In addition, 
policy-makers’ initial preferences on regional integration seemed to tailor much better 
with a NAFTA-style FTA rather than EC-style CM model. Moreover, the structural 
realities in the two regions – limited economic complementarity and low trade 
interdependence, unstable economic conditions and intra-regional differences in trade 
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policies – seemed (and for some continue) to contradict the viability of such 
ambitious endeavours (see Burges 2005; Chauvin and Gaulier 2002: 50-52). Finally, 
existing studies have found little influence of economic pressure groups which might 
have affected the decision; and to the extent that they did, protection rather than 
offensive interests seem to have dominated (see Gardini 2006; Lee 2003). I therefore 
suggest that policy-makers have sought to emulate a successful and highly legitimate 
model from the EC, in the absence of a thorough assessment of costs and benefits, 
either because they identified with the EU’s market-building approach (Mercosur) or 
because they largely took EU-type integration approaches for granted (SADC), amidst 
direct and indirect EU support (spurred emulation).  
Mercosur: Identifying with the EC’s Market-Building Approach 
In South America, the depth of the foreign debt crisis brought to power new 
Presidents in 1989, Carlos Menem in Argentina and Fernando Collor in Brazil, who 
espoused a firm commitment to economic liberalization as the recipe to reverse the 
bad economic fortunes of their countries. They set on track an ambitious and quite 
revolutionary programme of unilateral trade liberalization, thereby emptying previous 
the previous cooperation approaches of selectiveness and gradualness of much of their 
meaning. When Uruguay and Paraguay joined negotiations for a common regional 
grouping in the Southern Cone in mid-1990, they had already decided to establish a 
CM (Gardini 2010: 92).  
 
How can we know that this CM objective indeed constituted a case of EU influence? 
Mercosur’s Treaty of Asunción uses clear EC terminology, speaking of the ‘free 
circulation of goods, services and factors of production’ through the ‘elimination of 
customs rights and non-tariff barriers’ through harmonization, the establishment of a 
Common External Tariff (CET) and the ‘adoption of a common commercial policy’ 
as well as the ‘coordination of macroeconomic and sectoral policies’ (Art. 1). The list 
of common policies to be coordinated under the Treaty reads like taken from the 
Single European Act, which was adopted only a few years earlier. Moreover, the 
Treaty envisaged the process to follow the classical steps of the EC model: start with 
the lowering of tariffs and the elimination of non-tariff barriers to trade, then establish 
a Customs Union (CU) and finally ensure the free circulation of other production 
factors to create a CM. Policy-makers directly involved in the negotiations, such as 
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former Brazilian Foreign Minister Luiz Felipe Lampreia clearly recall that “reference 
to the EU was constant” in the negotiations (Interview, 29.5.2009). Several interview 
partners suggested that there was a general ambition to create something similar to 
that which had happened in Europe before. This has to be partly seen against the 
background that policy-makers in the region perceived the EC as “stronger and more 
radiant than ever, and much less dependent on the outside world” (cited in 
Vasconcelos 2007: 167). But there was also a more general identification with the EC 
integration process, which trumped that of NAFTA, as an Argentinean policy-maker 
formulates: “there was a predominant sense of identification with the EU 
‘community’ approach to economic integration, as opposed to the more ‘market-
oriented’ models of NAFTA and the FTAA” (Bouzas 2003: 15-16).  
 
However, this decision to pursue an EC-style CM model was hardly based on a 
thorough calculation of cost and benefits. The Asunción Treaty’s ambition to 
complete the CM within four years attests to a clear lack of serious assessment of 
what such a process entails, which one policy-maker in Mercosur confirms: “If we go 
to the documents or to the minutes of the discussions between Brazil and Argentina, 
nowhere can you find a very detailed study concerning the technicalities of a customs 
union or a common market. You just have political enthusiasm” (Interview with Paulo 
Roberto de Almeida, 3.6.2009). Once the Treaty had been adopted and Mercosur 
representatives were eager to seek recognition and support from Brussels, active EU 
support was quickly forthcoming. The Council held its first informal ministerial 
meeting in 1992 and the Commission initiated various cooperation projects worth 24 
million Euros between 1992 and 1995 aimed primarily at supporting Mercosur’s 
institutionalization (for a complete list, see Botto 2009: 185-86). Moreover, it trained 
officials and built epistemic networks, versed in EU ways of doing things, through the 
establishment of a Training Centre for Regional Integration (CEFIR) in Montevideo, 
Uruguay, and the Institute for European-Latin American Relations (IRELA) in 
Madrid.5  
 
This support, as well as more general identification with the EU approach to 
regionalism, turned out to be decisive in sticking to agreed commitments in the early 
                                                
5 The former organized 30 activities with around 1500 participants between 1993 and 1995 (CEFIR 
information leaflet).   
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years of Mercosur. In the run-up to the adoption of the Ouro Preto Protocol in 1994 
and the establishment of a Common External Tariff (CET) at the end of 1995, various 
powerful actors in Brazil and Argentina advocated abandoning the CU and CM 
commitments to be able to negotiate FTAs with important external trade partners, 
especially the US (see Nogueira Batista 1994). They mobilized in favour of a 
‘shallow integration paradigm’ that would not include the harmonization of policies 
and a CET. However, among the academic publications in the period from 1991 to 
1995, 82 percent made implicit or explicit reference to an EU deep integration 
paradigm, whereas only 18 percent referred to a NAFTA- or FTAA-style approach 
(Botto 2009: 12), indicating the overwhelming academic consensus of the desirability 
of the former. Moreover, the EU’s technical support, its creation of epistemic 
networks and the promised negotiation of a trade agreement with Mercosur as a bloc 
rather than individually also contributed in important ways to maintaining previous 
commitments.  
SADC: Taking the EC’s Market-Building Approach ‘ for Granted’ 
The Windhoek Treaty originated in the desire of Heads of States ‘to formalize 
SADCC’, agreed upon at the Harare Summit in 1989. However, it soon became clear 
that steps towards regional economic integration needed to form an integral part of a 
new treaty in order to counter Africa’s marginalization in view of the decisive moves 
towards regionalism in other parts of the world. However, both a NAFTA-style FTA 
model as well as an EC-style CM model were deemed compatible with these realities, 
as a preparatory document by the SADCC Secretariat to the Council of Ministers 
meeting in August 1991 suggested: “In the face of the region’s realities, and the 
current international tendencies toward the establishment of economic blocks, the 
region must accept to transform itself into an economic block similar to the proposed 
North American free trade zone or the European Economic Community” (SADCC 
Secretariat 1991b: 361).6 Without any serious debate in the region7, an EC-style CM 
model soon started to be favoured by most Heads of State, with the 1991 Council 
concluding that the new framework must provide “for crossborder investment, trade 
                                                
6 Both models were also deemed compatible with the pan-African ambition to form an African 
Economic Community (see SADCC Secretariat 1991a). 
7 The SADCC records mention no single study conducted to weigh the costs and benefits of the two 
potential options for regional economic integration. In fact, a 1986 intra-regional trade study still 
concluded that tariff reductions “are likely to have little or no effect on the volume of intra-regional 
trade” (SADCC Secretariat 1986: 109). 
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and labour and capital flow across national boundaries” (SADCC Council of 
Ministers 1991: 16). The Windhoek Treaty, adopted at the Summit in August 1992, 
subsequently codified the new objective of establishing an Economic Community – 
using EC terminology – through ‘the progressive elimination of obstacles of the free 
movement of capital and labour, goods and services, and of the peoples of the region 
generally’ and by harmonizing ‘political and socio-economic policies’ (Art 5[2]). The 
list of coordinated policies under the Treaty also contains most of the policies the 
EC’s Treaty of Rome also foresaw. These similarities might not come as a surprise 
given the fact that an EC-paid European lawyer assisted in drafting the Treaty 
(Interview with Stephen Kokerai, 9.11.2009). 
 
Despite the new objective, however, little progress was made in implementing market 
liberalization measures as member states continued to fear decisive market opening. 
As an emulation account would expect, the market integration objective remained a 
dead letter for most of the 1990s, while member states continued with the previous 
practice of coordinating sectoral policies through the negotiation of sectoral protocols. 
However, the adoption of an EC-CM objective had raised increasing hopes among 
SADC’s International Cooperation Partners (ICPs) for enhanced economic 
integration, not least with the EU which strengthened relations with the grouping after 
the accession of South Africa in 1994 (Holland 1995). When these hopes were 
increasingly disappointed, they started to voice their dissatisfaction with the lack of 
progress. As early as 1993, the SADC Secretariat expressed its fear that “SADC is 
losing credibility and risks losing the support of cooperation partners” (SADC 
Council of Ministers 1993: 39). This externally induced legitimacy crisis of the 
organization continued as progress remained slow. The Dutch entirely abandoned 
their support in 1998 and the Consultative Conference, hitherto “the most important 
event in the SADC’s calendar of activities” (Sidaway 1998: 564), did not take place 
for the first time in the same year. At the same time, the organization was confronted 
with rumors that the EU, its most important benefactor, would restructure its 
cooperation with Africa and possibly abandon its Regional Indicative Programme 
(SADC Council of Ministers 2000: 82) – just as consultations on the new Programme 
were about to start. Given that external donors provide almost 60 percent of SADC’s 
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budget8, this legitimacy crisis, which reached its peak towards the end of the decade, 
by then commanded decisive action to improve SADC’s performance. 
 
In response, policy-makers quickly engaged in a fundamental restructuring of SADC 
institutions, which also entailed a more precise and detailed plan on how to achieve 
the CM objective. This led to further emulation from the EU, heavily spurred by 
active financial and technical support offered by the Commission and other European 
donors. The Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP), adopted in 
2003, outlines a roadmap for economic integration, detailing the move from a FTA 
via a Customs Union towards a CM, a Monetary Union and finally the adoption of a 
common currency (SADC Summit 2003). It reads like taken from an EU integration 
manual condensing Europe’s long integration experience into a 15-year period. Some 
inspiration was taken also from the EU’s Lisbon agenda with its detailed targets and 
time limits. The transport chapter envisages, for example, to ‘liberalize regional 
transport markets’ and ‘harmonize transport rules, standards and policies’ as well as 
to remove ‘avoidable hindrances and impediments to the cross border movement of 
persons, goods and services’. The RISDP was prepared by a team of experts from the 
region, which was embedded in a wider network of actors that clearly formed an EU-
centered epistemic community. The head of the project was Angelo Mandlane, who 
received a PhD in economics from the University of Sussex; the Norwegian and UK 
development agencies NORAD and DFID primarily financed it; and EU-financed 
consultants actively participated in the process throughout (Interview with Ian 
Rossiter, 2.11.2009). While the details of the RISDP are based on extensive 
consultations with a variety of actors, including several studies by research institutes 
in the region indicating a process of lesson-drawing from different integration 
schemes, the broad outlines of the envisaged process hint at ‘unquestioned’ 
emulation. When asked why the RISPD seems to draw extensively on the EC 
integration experience, the ‘father’ of the RISDP replied that he wouldn’t call it the 
EC model but rather the “standard model of economic integration” (Interview with 
Angelo Mandlane, 13.11.2009). 
                                                
8 SADC Executive Secretary, ‘Talking Notes for the Post-Council of Ministers Diplomats Briefing’, 
February 2006; available at: www.sadc.int (figure is for 2006/07). 
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DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISMS: EVOLUTIONARY EMULATION 
FROM THE ECJ MODEL 
In the course of legalizing world politics, DSMs have become a central element in 
economic integration processes to ensure the credibility of trade liberalization 
commitments. Institutional options range from diplomatic dispute resolution based on 
direct negotiations between the parties to legalistic forms based on independent third-
party review (Smith 2000). However, multilateral dispute resolution arrangements 
under the GATT and later WTO have essentially served as a baseline for regional 
DSMs concerning trade liberalization, at least for GATT/WTO members. 
 
In line with their modest ambition in terms of economic cooperation and their firm 
commitment to national sovereignty, policy-makers in both regions initially rejected 
any formal stipulations on dispute settlement, relying instead on direct negotiations 
between governments. When they endorsed trade liberalization commitments in the 
early 1990s, as we have seen in the previous section, both regions soon endorsed 
more formalized DSMs. While this move can be accounted for by functional theories, 
they are indeterminate as to their strength and specific design features. Indeed, despite 
very similar initial trade liberalization commitments on paper, SADC opted for a 
permanent Tribunal right away, whereas Mercosur originally settled upon a weakly 
institutionalized GATT-type arrangement based on negotiation, mediation and ad hoc 
panels. Since then, both regions have gradually moved towards an ECJ-style DSM. 
While SADC already features a supranational ECJ copy, Mercosur governments have 
recently agreed to establish a supranational ECJ-style Mercosur Court of Justice, the 
details of which remain to be worked out.  
 
This development poses a puzzle: Why did policy-makers increasingly opt for ECJ-
style DSMs when their concerns about sovereignty and their initial rejection of strong 
regional institutionalization suggest that GATT/WTO-style arrangements would have 
been better suited? Especially the new WTO DSM might be viewed as similarly 
‘functional’ in addressing the underlying cooperation problem of monitoring 
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compliance with incomplete contracts (Garrett 1992).9 As we will see below, there are 
few indications that DSM design was based on explicit member state calculations, 
which thoroughly weighed the costs and benefits, e.g. sovereignty costs vs. 
anticipated benefits of deeper integration or treaty compliance benefits vs. policy 
discretion costs (Mattli 2000; Smith 2000). Moreover, my research revealed a 
negligible role of private operators, which might have prodded their governments 
towards stronger DSMs to ensure the legal certainty of their investments. Instead, I 
suggest that conscious emulation from the ECJ model reflected an attempt to gain 
credibility with ICPs, whose continued material support to the broader project seemed 
to be in danger at various points during the 1990s (SADC), or the increasing traction 
of emulation arguments advanced by a variety of regional actors in a context of 
increasing attempts to revive the integration process in the wake of a major economic 
crisis (Mercosur). 
SADC Tribunal: Emulating the ECJ amidst Credibility Concerns 
The Windhoek Treaty established a permanent Tribunal with the power to ‘give 
advisory opinions’ and whose decisions were to be ‘final and binding’ (Art. 16); with 
further design features to be left to a separate protocol. This Protocol was adopted in 
2000 and gave the Tribunal a range of powers, which makes it even stronger than the 
ECJ. It is a clear ECJ copy, sharing with it all major attributes of institutional design 
(see Karen Alter’s article in this issue): compulsory jurisdiction (Art 15c, Protocol on 
Tribunal), exclusive competence to constitutional and administrative review, private 
access and a preliminary rulings procedure (Art 16), which is a literal copy of Art 177 
of the Treaty of Rome. It even goes beyond the ECJ’s design in that non-compliance 
suits cannot only be brought by other treaty organs (Art 17) but also by individuals 
when all other domestic remedies have been exhausted (Art 15b) (for a good 
overview, see Ruppel and Bangamwabo 2008). How can we explain this emulation 
from the ECJ? 
 
As we have seen before, the move towards market integration in SADCC started to be 
discussed in the late 1980s. In 1991, an expert team made recommendations on a 
                                                
9 The SADC Trade Protocol, for example, explicitly states that disputes are settled through negotiation 
and ad hoc expert panels – a GATT-type arrangement – rather than being subject to the SADC 
Tribunal per se (Art. 32). 
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revised institutional structure in light of the envisaged integration agenda. It argued 
that its institutions ‘are adequate and effective generally’, mentioning only in a side 
note (not in the list of institutions to be officially included in the new Treaty) that 
“settlement of disputes shall be by arbitration, and an arbitration tribunal or 
committee shall be provided for” (Malima et al. 1991: 379). The two considered 
options – Tribunal or committee – essentially reflect the institutional alternatives 
available internationally, a permanent ECJ-type or an ad hoc GATT-type adjudication 
mechanism. But these two options were merely mentioned, without any discussion of 
their respective advantages and disadvantages, and their implications for national 
sovereignty. Even the theme document for the 1992 Consultative Conference with 
SADC’s ICPs, which was prepared by a group of experts and for the first time 
seriously engaged justifications for different approaches to economic integration in 
the region, was largely silent on the issue. It merely noted that a regional development 
community requires “mechanisms of mediation and arbitration, to which all agents of 
integration – governments, business, civil associations and individuals – can seek 
justice” (SADCC 1992: 41-42). Hence, when the decision was taken to establish a 
Tribunal with the Windhoek Treaty, no real discussion on the costs and benefits of 
each option had taken place at the regional level. 
 
However, around the same time, it became increasingly clear that the geopolitical 
changes of the Cold War, especially the rapid turn of Eastern European countries to 
market capitalism, would mean increasing competition over scarce resources supplied 
mainly by Northern industrialized countries. The SADCC Summit of 1991 shared the 
Secretariat’s fear, for example, that “the existing patterns of net resource flows are 
likely to, at best, stay the same in real terms, in the face of keen competition for aid 
and investment from the other parts of the world, notably Eastern Europe” (SADCC 
Summit 1991: 7). Given SADC’s dependence on both aid and investment from the 
EU and other regions, these fears quickly elevated investment market integration and 
the mobilization of own resources for the operation of SADC to the top of the 
regional agenda (SADCC Council of Ministers 1992b: 2-3). This was also against the 
background that the main impact of the envisaged CM was to be expected in 
stimulating ‘new types of investment’ rather than increasing intra-regional trade 
(SADCC Council of Ministers 1992a: 2).  
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In this context, retaining the credibility and legitimacy with external aid and 
investment partners, most of whom were able to transmit their views at the annual 
Consultative Conferences, was paramount. In other words, SADC needed to ensure 
that important external partners believed that SADC was worth their continued 
engagement and investment. In this situation, member states drew on the credibility of 
the ECJ model to signal to their partners that the new integration effort justified their 
continued support by establishing a Tribunal that evoked similarity. The Treaty 
stipulations remained vague, however, which allowed SADC Ministers to ‘believe’ 
shortly before the treaty was signed that it “only fully provides for the central 
intergovernmental organs of the community, i.e. the Summit, Council, Standing 
Committee of Officials, the Secretariat and the Tribunal” (SADCC Council of Ministers 
1992b: 35, my emphasis).  
 
With South Africa’s accession to SADC in 1994, the issue of sovereignty became 
imminent (Schoeman nd: 8). It had concerns that the Tribunal would challenge its 
strong Constitutional Court – concerns that were eventually overcome in principle 
[REF]. When member states finally started work on the Protocol in the late 1990s, the 
context of SADC integration had changed again in two important respects. First, with 
the transition from GATT to the WTO a new institutional DSM model had become 
available, which was perfectly compatible with original Treaty stipulations on the 
Tribunal, including the mention of ‘advisory opinions’. It remained less 
institutionalized than the ECJ and seemed more suited to a legal environment 
characterized by sovereignty concerns and lack of direct effect of treaty stipulations. 
Second, ICPs had grown increasingly dissatisfied with the performance of SADC and 
threatened to cut their funding, as we have seen before. In particular, they posited 
doubts about the ability to improve the record of the organization without an 
enhanced DSM that could push member states to abide by their commitments (see 
SADC Council of Ministers 1999: 112). 
 
There is little evidence in the records that a WTO-type model was ever seriously 
considered. Instead, an EC-financed British judge formed part of the experts who 
drafted the Protocol and he contributed his views on ‘what an effective and credible 
DSM ought to entail’ (Interview with Stephen Kokerai). In an attempt to ensure such 
credibility towards the outside amidst serious legitimacy constraints, designers readily 
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emulated central ECJ features and even went beyond it in allowing private parties to 
bring non-compliance suits under specific circumstances and explicitly providing for 
the development of ‘Community jurisprudence’ by the Tribunal (Art 21b).10 
However, they capped the Tribunal’s potential encroachment on national sovereignty 
by stipulating that the Summit, acting by unanimity, would retain the final decision 
over sanctions in case of non-compliance with a ruling. Moreover, even a preliminary 
rulings procedure and private access, which has been so consequential in Europe’s 
legal revolution, is much less likely to be sovereignty-encroaching in the absence of 
direct effect (Keohane et al. 2000: 467-78). As long as member states do not 
incorporate rules into their domestic legal corpus, they do not constitute a claimable 
right among citizens. Given the notoriously low compliance rates in SADC, these 
features may well turn out to be a ‘toothless tiger’ by implicit design (see Frimpong 
Oppong 2008).   
Mercosur: Gradual Emulation from the ECJ 
Mercosur’s first DSM, adopted in 1991 with the Protocol of Brasilia, was purely 
intergovernmental DSM and designed along GATT lines. It was barely used as 
member states preferred to deal with disputes directly through bilateral negotiations.11 
Towards the end of the decade, however, it drew increasing criticism from academics 
as well as civil society actors in the region. The problem lied less in its inability to 
settle disputes between member states, there simply were few; it had more to do with 
its failure to ensure compliance with Mercosur legislation. Compliance rates were 
(and continue to be) generally low because it often takes member states years to 
incorporate secondary legislation into their domestic legal systems in view of 
parliamentary or bureaucratic resistance (Interview with Evandro Didonet, 4.6.2009). 
However, in the absence of other member states bringing complaints to the ad hoc 
Adjudication Tribunal, this situation could not be mitigated through the DSM. An 
increasing number of actors therefore started arguing at the time that a supranational 
court was “sorely needed” (see Araujo 2001: 35). This was also the main claim 
advanced by an advocacy coalition, which emerged at the time. It features a series of 
                                                
10 Designing such an ambitious DSM in the face of severe financial constraints to operate it was 
possible because member states assumed that ICPs would contribute to its financing (see: 
http://www.sadc.int/tribunal/organisation.php). 
11 Between 1991 and 2002, the year when a new arrangement came into force, member states had made 
10 references to the DSM. 
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high-profile legal experts from the region such as Alejandro Perotti or Deisy Ventura, 
many of whom had studied in Europe and/or written doctorates on the European legal 
system and its applicability to Mercosur (see Perotti, A. 2004). They have, over time, 
become quite consequential in pushing for an ECJ-style DSM in Mercosur, in tandem 
with the smaller Mercosur members Uruguay and Paraguay, who have shared this 
objective from the start.  
 
In the wake of the Brazilian/Argentinean financial and economic crisis, which hit the 
region harshly in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the entire integration process 
plunged into crisis. Conflicts between member states over the application of Mercosur 
rules started to proliferate as Argentina sought protection from cheap Brazilian 
imports by erecting barriers to the free flow of goods, threatening to unravel the entire 
project (Gomez Mera 2005). This opened a ‘window of opportunity’ for these groups 
to advance their claims with increasing vigor. Even though member states continued 
to deal with the fallout of the crisis quite effectively through ‘presidential diplomacy’ 
rather than recourse to the DSM (Malamud 2003), they nevertheless decided to 
strengthen it with the 2002 Olivos Protocol, which established a Permanent Review 
Tribunal (PRT) modeled on the WTO. However, in a further attempt to ensure the 
continued credibility of the integration process, they also contained a provision on 
‘consultative opinions’ from the PRT (Art 3). Elaborating it in Decision CMC No 
37/03 and Decision CMC No 02/07, member states emulated the wording of Art 177 
of the Treaty of Rome, but did neither allow national courts nor the Mercosur 
Secretariat to request such opinions, thereby clearly protecting national sovereignty. 
 
However, the aforementioned crisis eventually brought to power new governments in 
most Mercosur countries, among which the election of Lula da Silva in Brazil in 2002 
was the most consequential for this process. He announced that he would seek to 
‘relaunch’ the integration process inter alia by strengthening Mercosur institutions. 
Before his election, one of his foreign policy advisors had already announced that 
Mercosur’s future would have to entail the creation of supranational institutions along 
EU lines (REF). Shortly thereafter, member states began discussions on a complete 
revision of Mercosur’s institutions 10 years after the Ouro Preto Protocol. In these 
negotiations, Uruguay tabled a proposal for the establishment of an ECJ-style 
Mercosur Court of Justice that would hold compulsory jurisdiction over all economic 
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integration matters in Mercosur, be endowed with an exclusive competence to 
constitutional and administrative review, have a more effective preliminary rulings 
procedure, and extend direct access to other treaty organs and private persons 
(Interview with Elbio Rosselli, 9.7.2009). Nevertheless, the larger member states 
rejected these demands, with Brazil arguing that the Brazilian Constitution does not 
allow for a legal body that constrains its Supreme Court (Interview with Reinaldo 
Salgado, 9.6.2009). Nevertheless, these ECJ-style institutional features constituted 
cornerstones in the debate on legal integration in Mercosur up to the highest 
governmental levels. 
 
Since then, the ECJ-focused advocacy coalition has continued to grow and has sought 
to hold Brazil to its general willingness to consider supranational institutions. This has 
set in motion a process that seems to currently succeed in overcoming remaining 
resistance to the establishment of a full-fledged ECJ-type supranational Court of 
Justice. The advocacy coalition has, often with the financial support of the EU and 
other European actors, stepped up its activities through a series of events where 
institutional reform is discussed and policy-makers confronted with ‘basic elements 
for the constitution of a Mercosur Court of Justice’ (Perotti, A. D. 2009). It 
increasingly joins forces with other powerful actors and Mercosur’s own institutions. 
The Supreme Courts in Mercosur, organized in an epistemic network, announced their 
general openness to the possible creation of a Mercosur Court (see Perotti, A. D. 
2009: fn 1), while the PRT regularly cites ECJ rulings in its own judgments, 
indicating their clear relevance to the Mercosur integration process. The newly 
created Mercosur Parliament has also been advocating its creation in the so-called 
‘political declaration’, which the member states endorsed in October 2010 (Decision 
CMC, 28/10). While the exact design features remain to be worked out, the member 
states have now committed in principle to the establishment of a supranational 
Mercosur Court of Justice.  
CONCLUSION 
This article has explored the dynamics of EU influence on regional integration in 
Mercosur and SADC. It has argued that EU influence has played an important role in 
central areas of both regions’ integration process, thereby confirming this volume’s 
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general assumption that diffusion theories provide useful tools to examine the effects 
of European Integration far beyond its own borders. More specifically, I suggested 
that EU influence has been the result of emulation dynamics, which were spurred by 
direct and indirect EU involvement amidst facilitating structural conditions. Spurred 
emulation, however, has seldom led to a wholesale copying of EU institutional 
models nor to the adoption of EU practices or behaviour, but EU templates have 
regularly been unpicked and adapted to fit with policy-makers’ normative 
convictions, especially their concerns about national sovereignty. While functional 
dynamics have thus played a role in facilitating and in some cases driving EU 
influence, they are alone insufficient, and sometimes quite misleading, to explain why 
policy-makers have increasingly opted, over time, for EU-type rather than NAFTA- 
or WTO-type models. 
 
Other more ‘constructivist’ motivations have certainly played an important role in 
conditioning EU influence, but these can hardly be generalized across the two 
regions. Whereas the need to retain credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of ICPs, on 
whose support the organization is highly dependent, is an important source of EU 
influence and regional dynamics more broadly in SADC, institutional choices in 
Mercosur are influenced much more strongly both by an identification of policy-
makers with the EU as well as the – partly EU-financed – activities of EU-centered 
epistemic and advocacy networks. Hence, the ways in which emulation effects are 
spurred by a variety of actors may vary between regions and over time. In both cases, 
however, the EU’s direct influence through ‘intervention’ into the domestic politics of 
member states plays only a secondary role.  
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